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A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform
the Practice of Forfeiture
I. INTRODUCTION
... and we'll live off the fat of the land...'
In the early morning of August 9, 1999, Mario Paz, a 61-year old
Mexican national and grandfather of fourteen, slept quietly with his wife
in their house in Compton, a working-class town in the sprawling San
Bernardino Valley, east of downtown Los Angeles.2 Outside his home,
an El Monte police SWAT team shot out both the front and rear door
locks, tossed in a "flash-bang" grenade, and stormed inside.' Appar-
ently awakened by the commotion, and quite probably frightened that he
was being robbed, Mr. Paz got up from his bed. What happened next
was the subject of constantly changing stories, but officials eventually
appeared to agree that Paz was kneeling on the floor at his bedside when
one of the SWAT officers entered the bedroom and shot Paz twice in the
back.4 Paz died shortly thereafter.5 Police hurriedly escorted Paz's
wife, clothed only in a towel and underpants, from the house while they
secured the scene.6
Inside the Paz's bedroom, police found and seized what they appar-
ently believed, at the time, was the legitimate object of the raid: $10,000
in cash, which was on Paz's bed.7 Police had recently seized 400
1. JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN. 56 (Penguin Books 1993) (1937).
2. Nicholas Riccardi, FBI Probes Man's Killing in Police Raid, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999,
at Al.
3. Id.
4. Three alternative stories have emerged from the El Monte police in the aftermath of the
Paz shooting. The initial explanation was that the officers believed Paz to be armed. A later
explanation stated that the officer saw Paz reaching for a gun. Both of these explanations were
hotly disputed by the Paz family. The current explanation states that Paz was reaching towards a
drawer which turned out to contain guns. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Paz's family has stated that Paz had just withdrawn the money from the Tijuana Bank
earlier that day.
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pounds of marijuana, guns, and $75,000 in cash at other sites, and made
the connection to the Paz home through some telephone bills and other
records found at one of those sites.8 El Monte Assistant Police Chief
Bill Ankeny said that although police had already arrested their narcotics
suspect, they went to Paz's home "to further the investigation.., to find
further evidence and proceeds." 9
Searching for "proceeds" would, to the most casual observer, seem
to be a reasonable objective of any drug raid. After all, since it is com-
monly believed that drug dealing is quite lucrative, it would appear logi-
cal to target and seize drug proceeds in order to frustrate the profitability
of the trade.' 0 Unfortunately, however, law enforcement has become
dependent on forfeiture as a revenue generating mechanism, creating a
conflict of interest in the way police agencies enforce the law. " I Indeed,
forfeiture has become the sole means of fiscal support for various multi-
ple jurisdictional task forces.' 2
For a police department that serves a poor, working class city, the
El Monte police are well-equipped and wield an inordinate amount of
political power.' 3 Over the last ten years, the department has received
about $4.5 million in forfeiture funds, which it is allowed to keep under
federal law. 4 The Paz shooting has raised, among other things, serious
concerns about the department's reliance on forfeited assets to support
itself, and a number of local officials have voiced concerns that the
department may be out of control.
15
The Paz incident was not the first time an innocent man paid with
his life for getting in the way of police officers searching for forfeitable
assets. In 1992, a multi-agency task force raided the 200-acre Malibu
8. Anne-Marie O'Connor, No Drug Link to Family in Fatal Raid, Police Say, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1999, at Al. The papers, including a driver's license with the Pazes' address, belonged
to Chino drug suspect Marcos Beltran Lizarraga, who had once been a neighbor of the Paz family,
and who had persuaded the Pazes to allow him to use their home as a mail drop. Id.
9. Nicholas Riccardi, Richard Windton, & Joe Mozingo, Slaying Brings Troubling Scrutiny
to El Monte Police Law Enforcement: Tough City Attributes Low Crime Rate to Department. But
Critics Say It Has Too Much Power, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at Al.
10. That is, of course, assuming arguendo that prohibition is the best approach to drug policy.
11. Karen Dillon, Taking Cash Into Custody Across U.S., Police Dodge State Seizure Laws,
KAN. CITY STAR, May 19, 2000, at Al available at http://www.kcstar.com/projects/drugforfeit/
new3.htm.
12. See David E. Kaplan, A Case Study in Policing for Profit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. July
10, 2000, at 22-23 available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/000710/impact.htm.
13. Riccardi, et. al., supra note 9. "El Monte officers have their own trading cards, a state-of-
the-art helicopter, an assault vehicle called the 'peacekeeper' and a five-disc CD changer in the
chief's car. With its political clout, the officers union has unseated two mayors." Id.
14. Id. The department had even used forfeited money to purchase the guns used by the
SWAT team that stormed into Paz's house, which was located more than a dozen miles from the




ranch of reclusive millionaire Donald Scott, purportedly in search of
marijuana plants.' 6 The police never found a single marijuana plant on
Scott's property, but they shot and killed Scott in the course of the
raid.' 7 After a subsequent investigation, the District Attorney for Ven-
tura County concluded that the primary motivation for the raid was the
possibility of forfeiting Scott's property. The forfeiture would have net-
ted law enforcement agencies about $5 million in assets.' 8
One might argue that the killings of two innocent men, both in their
sixties, have wreaked far more havoc on society than all the marijuana in
California. 9 Yet the collective mentality of our nation's ongoing war
against narcotics has created an atmosphere in which politicians con-
stantly assure the body politic2" that any price is worth paying to keep
the "evil" of drugs from our collective doorsteps. The mere suggestion
of reforming drug policy is tantamount to political suicide. Despite
decades of abject failure, the trend has been to harden the government's
stance on drugs in a campaign which has increasingly militaristic over-
tones. 2' Congress took a major step toward solidifying this hard-line
stance when it passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act22 in 1970, and included a provision that law enforcement
officials would be able to seize and forfeit assets allegedly related to
16. Michael Fessier, Jr., Trail's End Deep in a Wild Canyon West of Malibu, a Controversial
Law Brought Together a Zealous Sheriff's Deputy and an Eccentric Recluse. A Few Seconds
Later, Donald Scott Was Dead, L.A. TIMES MAG., Aug. 1, 1993.
17. Id. Ironically, a commander at a pre-raid briefing told the officers that this was "about
plants, not the people." Id. No plants were found and, after the raid, one person was dead. Id.
18. Report on the Death of Donald Scott (Office of the District Attorney, Ventura County,
Cal., Mar. 30, 1993), available at http://www.fear.org/chron/scott.txt.
19. Despite repeated pronouncements by drug war hawks on the dangers of marijuana, the
U.S. Government has not shown that a single person has died from or been seriously injured by
marijuana use. In fact, a recent study published by the Institute of Medicine concluded that
marijuana appears to have some therapeutic effects. See generally INSTrUTE OF MEDICINE,
MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE (1999), at http://www.nap.edu/books/
0309071550/html. In light of such scientific evidence, at least with respect to marijuana, the drug
war cannot be sustained on objective grounds, but only on grounds of ideology and the self-
aggrandizing instincts of law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and politicians who have built
their careers on promises to make streets safe by locking up drug offenders and forfeiting their
assets. Whether or not the reader believes that police killed Paz and Scott in the course of
searching for assets to seize and forfeit, Paz, Scott and their families are victims of politics in the
purest sense of the phrase.
20. The term "body politic," for purposes of this Comment, means those voters and taxpayers
who are in a position to hold elected officials accountable for their policies and actions.
21. Especially since the first term of the Reagan Administration, the use of military
surveillance technology, as well as military planes, helicopters, and vessels for interdiction
purposes, has been on the increase. See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging 'Drug
Exception' to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 892-94 (1987).
22. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970), (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-886 (1994)).
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drug violations.23 The 1984 amendments to this Act24 broadened the
scope of civil forfeitures and provided detailed procedural steps, the lack
of which had previously been a stumbling block to the government in
forfeiture proceedings.25 Remarkably, the 1984 amendments even gave
the Attorney General full control over the disposition of forfeited
assets.26
Current federal and state laws that allow police departments to
seize and forfeit assets and remit the proceeds to their own budgets have
generated a mountain of criticism over the past decade. 27  Although
acknowledging at least the potential for abuse, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to curb state and federal power to forfeit personal prop-
erty.28 Perhaps the Court itself has become caught up in the hysteria of
the drug war. 29 Certainly, the Court has engaged in some acrobatic rea-
soning to uphold forfeitures, 30 basing many of its decisions on an
archaic legal fiction, 3' the usefulness of which was already called into
question in the middle of the nineteenth century.
23. § 101, 84 Stat. at 1276 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)). The civil forfeiture provision of
the Act authorized law enforcement to seize and forfeit drugs, drug manufacturing equipment,
drug storage, and conveyances used to transport drugs. The 1984 amendment also gave the
Attorney General control over the disposition of forfeited assets, thus creating a deeply troubling
separation of powers issue which has not been addressed by the courts or by the Reform Act. See
21 U.S.C. § 88 1(e); see also Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHi. L. REV. 35 (1998).
24. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, secs.
306, 309, 518, § 881(e), 98 Stat. 2050, 2051, 2075 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(e) (1994)).
25. See David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases, Release 25 13.01 at
13-3 to 13-4 (Matthew Bender December 1999).
26. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23.
27. See, e.g., Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified? 39 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 311 (1994); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23.
28. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 456-57 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice
Thomas expressed concern that, "[i]mproperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette
wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose property is
unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with criminals, than a
component of a system of justice." Id. Nevertheless, Justice Thomas found that "[w]hen the
property sought to be forfeited has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime ... the
Constitution apparently assigns to the States and to the political branches of the Federal
Government the primary responsibility for avoiding that result." Id. As shall be discussed infra,
whether the political branches have succeeded in avoiding that result is most certainly an open
question.
29. Professor Bernard Oxman once commented that the Court has an unspoken rule: "In drug
cases, the government always wins." Conversation with the author, Oct. 1999.
30. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926), discussed
infra, text accompanying notes 65 through 77.
31. That a thing can be guilty of a wrong, thus justifying an in rem action. See Tamara R.
Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid
Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916-18 (1991).
32. The Court's decisions over the past decade have left in their wake more contradiction than
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As the Paz incident suggests, the Court's failure to proscribe police
power in civil forfeiture actions has led to a situation in which self-
aggrandizing law enforcement agencies act with near impunity.33
Because the government can proceed against the property in a civil in
rem action that is separate from any criminal prosecution, law enforce-
ment has found it easier to go after "tainted" property via the civil asset
forfeiture process.3 4 As law enforcement agencies have come to increas-
ingly depend on forfeiture to finance their operations, law enforcement
priorities have been corrupted: interdiction efforts end up targeting
money and property rather than black market drugs and drug sellers.35
More disturbingly, because so few owners can afford to challenge the
seizure, or because a plaintiff might not be entitled to Fifth Amendment
protection in the course of the proceedings and therefore does not want
to risk exposing himself to the possibility of being indicted,36 and
because the procedural rules so overwhelmingly favor the government,
very few forfeitures are ever challenged. As a result, law enforcement
finds in rem civil asset forfeiture to be an excellent means of raising
revenue and appropriating funds without having to justify those reve-
nues and appropriations to the body politic. 37 This is also a sweet deal
clarity. For example, while the alleged perpetrator of a crime is protected by the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, an innocent owner has no constitutional protection from
the "strict liability" imposed by in rem forfeiture statutes. Compare Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993) and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) with Bennis v. Michigan,
516 U.S. 442 (1996). See also infra, note 48 and accompanying text.
33. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 39 (stating that, "however irrational [the drug
war] may be as public policy, it is fully rational as a political and bureaucratic strategy").
34. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1999). The procedural rules of the recently amended law
allowed the government to seize the property on a mere showing of probable cause. The burden
then shifted to the owner, if he wished to contest the forfeiture, to post a bond for ten percent of
the property's value, or $5,000 whichever was less, and then prove to a court that the property
should not be subject to forfeiture. Other procedural terms that favored the government included
the fact that the government could seize the property years after the property had been "tainted,"
but the owner had only ten days to respond and challenge the seizure. See discussion, infra, text
accompanying notes 162 through 229.
35. One reason which commentators and officials have given for this is that, under the law,
forfeited drugs must be destroyed, and thus generate zero revenue for the agencies that seize them.
See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 68. This created an interesting skewing of priorities
on 1-95 in Florida, where police have focused interdiction efforts on southbound, rather than
northbound, traffic, because the southbound route has more cash-flush buyers than the northbound
side, where most of the dealers are transporting "worthless" drugs out of state. Id.
36. See Piety, supra note 3 1, at 921 n.50 and accompanying text (pointing out that a criminal
defendant, by testifying in a parallel forfeiture proceeding, may risk waiving his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination). This, of course, contradicts the Court's holding in the well-
known case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) which held that the Fifth Amendment
applied to papers seized in forfeiture cases. The Court has made no particular effort, in recent
years, to take notice of Boyd. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 303-06 (1996) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. Indeed, numerous local police departments circumvent state laws that forbid placing
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for elected officials, because the revenue generated from forfeited assets
allows politicians to promise more action on the drug war without neces-
sarily having to raise taxes or shift appropriations away from politically
popular government programs. 31 In this post-Reagan era of "no new
taxes," asset forfeiture provides a way for law enforcement agencies to
achieve a degree of immunity from the sometimes uncertain political
dynamics of raising public revenue.
All of this can drive even a modestly thoughtful citizen to worry
about the corrosive effect of the drug war on our democratic institutions.
Yet despite nearly thirty years of failure in the drug war, efforts to at
least reform the process, let alone consider alternative paradigms,39 seem
generally doomed. Some have argued that reforming our asset forfeiture
laws would be equivalent to raising the white flag in the war against
narcotics and setting a course toward de-criminalization.4 ° For that rea-
son, it came as a surprise to many when the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act passed the House of Representatives in June, 1999, by an
overwhelming majority.4'
The margin of passage in the House stirred momentum for a final
reform measure to be passed and enacted before the 2000 election sea-
son. Through a year-long process of compromise measures in the Sen-
ate42 and in the joint committee, a final version of the Act emerged in
the spring of 2000, and was signed into law by President Clinton on
April 25, 2000. The final bill was titled The Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000."3
The Reform Act offers some laudable due process changes, such as
forfeited proceeds directly into law enforcement budgets by referring locally initiated forfeitures
to federal law enforcement officials. Such "adoptive" forfeitures allow local police departments
to receive about eighty percent of the proceeds, even where state laws mandate sending forfeited
proceeds to other programs, such as schools. See Dillon, supra note 11.
38. See discussion, infra, text accompanying notes 244 through 258.
39. Unfortunately, even though this country now holds one-fourth of the world's prisoners-
two million people, a huge number of them being nonviolent drug offenders-politicians who
support alternative paradigms such as legalization are repeatedly denounced by drug war hawks
such as our drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey. Matthew Miller, Just Said No to the Drug War,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, at § 6, p.32 .
40. See Roger Pilon, Testimony before the Criminal Justice Oversight Subcommittee of the
United States Senate, July 21, 1999, available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-rp072199.html.
41. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong., § 1 (1999). The vote in
favor was by a margin of 375 to 48. This original House version of the Reform Act was stronger
than the final version.
42. The Justice Department brought a great deal of lobbying force to bear on the Senate,
resulting in a couple of proposals which would have been likely to make things worse, in
particular, S. 1701, 106th Cong. (1999).
43. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185 § 14, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(114 Stat. 202) (hereinafter, "Reform Act").
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shifting the burden of proof onto the government,' eliminating the
requirement that an owner post a cost bond, and providing some mini-
mal hardship protections for an innocent party who might be dispos-
sessed of his home. The Reform Act does not, however, offer a cure for
forfeiture's greatest ongoing ill, the direct disbursement of forfeited rev-
enues to law enforcement agencies, and the general reliance on forfeited
proceeds as a revenue raising device.
45
It seems appropriate at this time to reflect on the current state of
forfeiture in this country, and to examine some likely effects of the
Reform Act. Part II of this Comment offers a brief historical overview
of forfeiture in the United States, including a distinction between crimi-
nal and civil forfeiture. Part III explains some of the more controversial
aspects of the current state of the law on asset forfeiture, in particular,
highlighting the confusion over whether and for what purposes forfeiture
can be deemed a "punishment." Part IV briefly discusses the history of
the Reform Act, and some of its key provisions. Part V will discuss
some of the issues that the Reform Act leaves unresolved. In particular,
this Comment takes the view that the "taint doctrine" needs to be
squarely addressed before any meaningful reform can take place, and
that forfeiture will still be vulnerable to attack on nondelegation grounds
unless strong action is taken to remove the revenue raising incentives
which the Reform Act leaves in place. This argument includes a policy
discussion on why externalizing the cost of a major government
endeavor (such as the drug war) onto individuals makes our democratic
system of political accountability less rational, and why it poses the dan-
ger that our criminal laws might become irrational, if indeed they are not
already so. Part VI offers some concluding thoughts, and offers a princi-
pled rule for using forfeiture in limited circumstances.
II. BACKGROUND
Numerous authors have commented on the historical origins and
evolution of forfeiture law in the United States, and this Comment does
not seek to duplicate their efforts.46 Nevertheless, a brief survey of the
44. Previously, the government did not have to prove anything once it had shown probable
cause and seized the property. The burden was then upon the owner to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the property was not subject to forfeiture. The Reform Act shifts this burden
of proof back to the government at the "preponderancd of the evidence" standard. See infra note
171.
45. See Reform Act, supra note 43.
46. See generally Piety, supra note 31, for a thorough examination of the historical origins of
forfeiture law. As a general matter, this Comment in part adopts her thesis that forfeiture is an
anachronistic legal device which has no legitimate place in a modem state such as ours, albeit for
slightly different reasons.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:81
evolution of forfeiture will serve to acquaint the reader with the issue.
A. The Deodand
The conventional view is that forfeiture dates back to the law of the
Old Testament.47 In England, forfeiture arose from the deodand, which
required that the value of an inanimate object directly or indirectly caus-
ing the accidental death of a king's subject be forfeited to the Crown.48
The deodand has been used to support the concept that the sovereign
could take action based on the guilt of a thing, which was considered to
be quite apart from the culpability of its owner.4 9 But whether the deo-
dand was meant to be a remedial measure, whether it was simply used
because there was no action for wrongful death available at common law
for a decedent's survivors, or whether there was some other reason,
remains obscure. 51 What is clear is that our Supreme Court continues to
pay homage to this historical oddity as doctrinal support for in rem
forfeiture.
47. "If an ox gore a man that he shall die, the ox shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be
eaten." Exodus 21:28-30, cited in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
681 (1974) as an historical origin of the deodand and in rem forfeiture.
48. Id. But see Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169 (1973). Finkelstein points out that:
Nowhere in the Bible is there to be found the slightest suggestion that an inanimate
object that had been the direct or indirect cause or agent of a person's death was to
be forfeited, or that its value was to be computed in terms of money which then
would be claimed by the authorities as a forfeiture. This is proved beyond a shadow
of a doubt in the case of the homicide by misadventure where the woodchopper's
axe head flies off the haft and kills one who stands nearby. (Deut. 19:5).
Id. at 180.
49. The deodand fell out of favor in England by the mid-nineteenth century, and was
abolished by law in 1846. Id. at 170. Commenting on the survival of the deodand up until that
time, Lord Campbell remarked that "[t]he wonder was that a law so extremely absurd and
inconvenient should have remained in force down to the middle of the 19th century." Id. at 171.
50. See Piety, supra note 31, at 928-35.
51. As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In
the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious
minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of
policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present
state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been
found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives a new content, and
in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5 (1881), cited in Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.19.
Holmes apparently believed that deodand and in rem forfeiture were related in that the concept of
motion made both practices understandable. See id. at 36, 26-27 (1881).
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B. Evolution in the United States: A Ship Off-Course
Like a trick candle that re-lights itself after having been blown out,
forfeiture has persisted in U.S. jurisprudence despite clear attempts in
the early days of the nation to eradicate it. Forfeiture was a hated mea-
sure among the colonists,52 and both the Constitution and statutes passed
by the first Congress forbade the use of criminal forfeiture in convic-
tions for treason and federal felonies.53
Forfeiture remained a tool, however, in certain matters involving
the collection of revenue, and at admiralty.54 It was from this tradition
that the confusion first emanated. As with the revenue section of the
Exchequer in England," forfeiture played a prominent role in enforcing
tax laws in the early part of our nation's history. At a time when the
government depended on customs duties for at least eighty percent of its
tax revenue, seizing and forfeiting a ship for a customs violation was the
only reasonable way of enforcing the nation's revenue laws.56
Aside from revenue cases, the first in rem civil cases in the U.S.
appear to have arisen under the country's admiralty laws, which were
adapted from the English Navigation Acts.57 It seems, though, that a
misunderstanding developed in the U.S. courts with respect to the pur-
pose of in rem forfeiture under the laws of England, and how it was
distinguished from the functions of criminal prosecutions and criminal
forfeiture.58 Perhaps this confusion developed due to the exigencies
52. The much despised Writs of Assistance allowed officers of the Crown to collect a
commission on forfeited goods. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 75 nn.143-44.
53. U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 3 forbids the forfeiture of estates resulting from convictions for
treason. The first Congress outlawed forfeiture as a consequence of federal criminal conviction.
54. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 39 (goods unloaded at night or without
a permit subject to forfeiture and persons unloading subject to criminal prosecution); § 25, 1 Stat.
at 43 (persons convicted of buying or concealing illegally imported goods subject to both
monetary fine and in rem forfeiture of the goods); § 34, 1 Stat. at 46 (imposing criminal penalty
and in rem forfeiture where person convicted of remanding goods entitled to drawback).
57. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 612 (1993); United States v. The Brig Eliza, 11
U.S. (7 Cran.) 113 (1812); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); United States v. La
Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
58. Note the argument of Attorney General Lee in La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 299-300,
that an in rem forfeiture was only properly carried out at admiralty to enforce the revenue laws,
and any action not intended to collect a debt, but rather for a violation of an embargo such as in
this case, could only be properly carried out as part of a criminal proceeding in a trial by jury. Id.
The Court disagreed, though, holding that, because the violation of the embargo occurred on the
water, the action was properly pursued at admiralty. id. at 301. The Supreme Court's decision in
The Palmyra, appears to have been another one which helped open the door to civil forfeiture
being used in a criminal context. Justice Story seems to have confused the purposes of civil in
rem forfeiture and criminal forfeiture. The Palmyra was a Spanish privateer vessel which had
been seized on suspicion of piracy. Id. at 2. On the government's appeal to the Supreme Court,
her owner contested the forfeiture in part on grounds that her crew was never convicted of a
2000]
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involved in preventing acts of piracy, and because of the need to deter
violations of arms trading embargoes during the uncertain years of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 59
In any case, it has left us with the rather odd dual legacy of in rem
civil forfeitures being used in a criminal, punitive context, and tried
without juries, even when they have nothing to do with admiralty.6°
Indeed, the argument has been made that this is merely an accident of
history. 6' However, accidents of history should not be followed with
blind obedience when they produce such manifestly absurd results as
civil forfeiture has in this country.
Once the Sixteenth Amendment had been passed and the govern-
ment came to depend primarily on income taxes, forfeiture became
mostly a thing of the past.62 Nevertheless, forfeiture played a role in the
first half of the twentieth century during the Prohibition era.63 The case
of United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile64 provides an interest-
crime, and that a conviction was a necessary prerequisite to an in rem proceeding. Id. at 7. Justice
Story noted that, while criminal forfeiture had traditionally required an accompanying conviction,
civil forfeiture under the revenue section of the Exchequer could be carried out merely against the
thing. Id. at 14-15. Clearly, though, the intent of a civil forfeiture provision under the revenue
laws was to create a remedial measure for enforcing the collection of customs duties, the
avoidance of which presents a question of injury to the sovereign which forfeiture can legitimately
redress. Justice Story failed to explore the pertinent issue, which was to what extent the
government was injured by the alleged acts of piracy, and to what extent forfeiture could purport
to redress the people for any such injury that could not be sufficiently pursued against the crew
under the criminal law.
59. The need to seize contraband, that is, things that are illegal in themselves to possess, is
often cited as another justification for in rem forfeiture. See Piety, supra note 31, at 948 n.183.
But that fails to explain why the common law would have countenanced the forfeiture of a vessel
carrying such contraband. In C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943), the Supreme Court
held that states inherited some common law rights to commerce proceedings in rem against
vessels engaging in illegal conduct on navigable waters. Moore, 318 U.S. at 135-36. The Court
reasoned that in rem proceedings were available to the Exchequer, and that the jurisdiction of the
Exchequer had not passed exclusively to the admiralty courts of the United States, but also to the
common law courts of the several states. Id. at 137-38. This reasoning might have been more
sound had the Court accounted for the fact that the Exchequer's authority to forfeit a vessel in rem
was grounded in its authority to enforce the revenue laws of England. See discussion, supra note
59. But even accepting the Court's reasoning, the issue in Moore was over the forfeiture of an
illegal fishing net, and the opinion could have simply ended with the reasoning that states have the
authority to regulate fishing in their navigable waters. Moore, 318 U.S. at 135.
60. See, e.g., La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 301 (holding that no jury required in admiralty
proceeding). This is particularly ironic in light of the Supreme Court's continuing ode to the
deodand. Deodand cases were tried by twelve-man juries, and historical indications are that these
juries were not so solicitous of the position of the Crown as are our own judges in forfeiture
proceedings to the government. See Piety, supra note 31, at 935 n. 108 (citation omitted).
61. See Piety, supra note 31, at 935-36 n.l1l.
62. See Smith, supra note 25, at 1.01, 1-1 to 1-2 (Matthew Bender December 1999).
63. Under the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 316 (1919) (repealed 1933),
conveyances of intoxicating liquors were subject to forfeiture.
64. 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
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ing perspective on how the "smoke and mirrors" logic of forfeiture
developed during that time.65 In that case, a suspect was arrested for
transporting liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act.66 While
the liquor agent took no action against the automobile used by the sus-
pect, a revenue agent subsequently brought a forfeiture action against
the automobile pursuant to a pre-Prohibition federal revenue statute
which rendered conveyances in the transport of untaxed liquor subject to
forfeiture.6 7 The owner of the vehicle intervened and claimed that it had
no knowledge that the vehicle was being used illegally.6"
The primary issue before for the Court was whether the innocent
owner defense under the National Prohibition Act applied, or whether
the revenue statute, which provided no innocent owner defense, ought to
prevail.6 9 The owner argued that, since liquor was illegal and tax stamps
for liquor were generally unavailable, it would be unreasonable to forfeit
the vehicle under the revenue law.7 0 The owner further contended that,
by enacting the National Prohibition Act, Congress had shifted emphasis
from taxing liquor for revenue purposes to punishing the sellers, and that
it would be a violation of due process to punish an innocent owner.7'
The Court disagreed, arguing that just because liquor was now illegal
did not mean that Congress had intended to cede its power to tax
liquor.7 2 With respect to the owner's second argument, the Court stated
that "[a] tax on intoxicating liquor does not cease to be such because the
sovereign has declared that none shall be manufactured, and because the
main purpose in retaining the tax is to make law breaking less profita-
ble."'73 Similar Kafka-esque reasoning has carried over into the increas-
ingly draconian drug prohibition period in which we now find
ourselves.7 4 In light of all the other parallels between the failings of
both alcohol and drug prohibition, this seems particularly fitting.
65. The remarkable contortions of logic used by the Court in this case are indicative of the
lengths to which otherwise reasonable people will go (and perhaps must go) to enforce
prohibitions against popular mind-altering substances.
66. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. at 324.
67. Id. at 323.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 325.
70. Id. at 326-27.
71. Id. at 328.
72. Id. at 326-27.
73. Id. at 328. But see Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 783 (1994)
(finding that a state tax on marijuana assessed after the state has imposed a criminal penalty for
the same offense violates the Double-Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment).
74. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 21.
75. No one seriously disputes the parallels between the failures of Prohibition and the Drug
War. The most obvious of these parallels is that, as efforts at enforcement and interdiction
become more aggressive, those efforts merely increase the so-called "crime tariff"; that is, the
markup that a black market trafficker must charge to monetize the risk he takes in breaking the
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III. SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE STATE OF THE LAW ON
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
Civil asset forfeiture has generated an enormous amount of statu-
tory and case law throughout this country's jurisprudential history, and it
is beyond the purview of this Comment to exhaustively review every
aspect of its evolution. It is possible, however, to grasp the current state
of the law on forfeiture by examining some key issues.
A confused doctrine has emerged over the years, especially with
respect to whether forfeiture is punishment under the Constitution, or
whether it is strictly remedial. This distinction seems to keep getting
murkier with each new decision.76 The Court also has sent worrisome
signals that it would endorse the use of forfeiture as a revenue-generat-
ing measure for law enforcement.77 This section will examine some per-
tinent aspects of this doctrine.
A. Forfeiture as a Revenue-Generating Measure
The use of forfeiture as a means of generating revenue represents
one of the most serious threats to personal liberty in U. S. history. Not
since the writs of assistance, which helped to inspire our revolution
against the British Crown,78 has a U.S. government mandated that law
enforcement officers be allowed, in essence, to eat what they kill. How-
ever, because we now enter the new century at a time when most Ameri-
cans seem to feel a certain material contentment, and because talk of
reforming our drug laws is anathema to most politicians, there is little
political agitation for any examination of this problem.79
Although forfeiture was made a tool of the war against drugs under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.80
it was not pursued regularly until the range of property subject to forfei-
law. See Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 894-95. This makes trafficking more profitable with each
measure taken by the government, and leads to the somewhat counter intuitive result of greater
volumes in trafficking. Id. at 895. More predictably, it also results in greater street violence as
gangs fight over lucrative turf.
76. Compare Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), and United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
267 (1996), with United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), and One 1995 Toyota Pick-Up
Truck v. District of Colombia, 718 A.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that, even though a statute
was intended to forfeit property in rem, its intent was also sufficiently punitive to implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause and make the forfeiture of plaintiffs vehicle excessive).
77. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989).
78. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 75 nn.143-45.
79. At the time of this writing, the United States is in the throes of a political season in which
the failings of the war on drugs have barely been broached by either of the two major political
parties. And even though the failed drug war was a prominent theme of the Shadow Conventions,
the media paid little attention to the issue.
80. Pub. L. 91-513, Title II, § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994)).
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ture was expanded under the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978.81
From 1979 through fiscal year 1980, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion claimed a six-fold increase in seizures and a twenty-fold increase in
forfeitures.82 President Reagan turned up the rhetoric in 1982, creating
the political impetus for even more extreme measures in the drug war.83
The Act was further amended in 1984 to include the forfeiture of real
property.84
Perhaps the most significant change in the 1984 amendments to the
Act, aside from the provision for forfeiting real property, was the exclu-
sive earmarking of forfeited assets for law enforcement.8  Whereas pro-
ceeds realized from forfeitures were previously deposited in the general
fund of the U.S. Treasury, the 1984 amendments mandated that such
proceeds be deposited directly into the Department of Justice's Forfei-
ture Fund86 and the Department of Treasury's Forfeiture Fund.87 These
changes have been at the heart of some of the most egregious abuses of
asset forfeiture.88
Since the 1984 amendments, forfeiture has become an important
measure by which law enforcement agencies have sought to raise reve-
nue for their own departments. 89 The federal laws are advantageous for
local or state agencies, because, through federal "adoption" of local for-
feitures, such agencies are usually able to receive more of the proceeds
81. Pub. L. 95-633, Title III, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(1994)). This provision greatly expanded the definition of forfeitable assets to include:
[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or
listed chemical in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange,
and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this title, except that no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
82. See Smith, supra note 25, at 1 1.01, 1-7 n.16.
83. See Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 891 (stating that the end of "getting" drug traffickers
justified "just about any means" seemed to be an idea whose time had come).
84. Section 306(a) of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1990)).
85. See Smith, supra note 25, at 1.01, 1-8.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1994).
87. See 31 U.S.C. § 9703 (1994).
88. The "real property" provision under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) led many prosecutors to forfeit
the homes of small-time dealers and marijuana growers merely to boost their forfeiture statistics,
despite the highly tenuous relationship of those properties to drug dealing and in spite of the
hardship that it caused to the families. Smith, supra note 25, at 1.01, 1-8.
89. Id. Part of the 1984 Act allows the federal government to share forfeiture "booty" with
local police agencies. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1994)).
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than they would under state law.90 Adoptive forfeitures have caused
headaches for state lawmakers. Many states have laws restricting the
disposition of forfeited assets to either a state's general treasury fund or
to special funds for education or other programs unrelated to law
enforcement. Local police departments circumvent such laws through
the use of adoptive forfeitures. 91
As a result, with the help of the federal government, local police
departments are able to directly raise cash for what they determine are
their priorities, free from accountability to any political process.92 This
has led to the alarming development of law enforcement gaining a pecu-
niary interest not only in forfeited property, 93 but in the very profitability
of the drug market itself.94 Certainly, this cannot be healthy for a demo-
cratic society.
95
Perhaps the most egregious example of the effects of such funding
is the creation of Multijurisdictional Task Forces ("MJTFs"), mostly
under the auspices of federal law,96 and which rely largely on asset for-
feitures to fund their operations.97 A MJTF called "South Florida
Impact" ("Impact"), which operates in cooperation with various South
Florida police departments, depends entirely on seizure of laundered
90. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 51-54. Under a so-called "adoptive forfeiture,"
state and local law enforcement officers seize the property and then bring it to a federal agency for
forfeiture. This allows the local agency to receive at least eighty percent of proceeds that it would
not be allowed to collect under state statutes.
91. Dillon, supra note 11.
92. Id.
93. Comment, Alison Roberts Solomon, Drugs and Money: How Successful Is the Seizure
and Forfeiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds? 42 EMORY L.J. 1149
(1993). Solomon takes the view that, "if raising revenue and financing the drug war with
proceeds from asset forfeiture are valid goals of the program, how well these goals are being met
is of concern to the taxpaying public." Id. at 1158. This Comment disagrees with Solomon's
underlying assumption that forfeiture can be a valid means of raising and appropriating revenue,
and instead favors the argument of Blumenson & Nilsen, supra, note 23, at 84-100, that using
forfeiture to raise revenue for law enforcement creates a dangerous conflict of interest, and
moreover violates our constitutional separation of powers.
94. This problem in particular may be what has helped turn the drug war into an end unto
itself instead of a means to protect public health. If the very survival of bureaucratic institutions
depends on cash and property seized from drug dealers, then those institutions automatically have
a vested interest in the continuing profitability of the black market.
95. The interest of the police in gaining economic independence has been recognized in the
past by such figures as SS Director Heinrich Himmler and his protdg6, SS Obergruppenfuhrer
Reinhard Heydrich, who was the Reichsprotektor of Bohemia-Moravia and the architect of the
Final Solution. Part of their strategy in making Bohemia-Moravia an SS-administered
Protectorate was to gain SS control over Czech industry, thus giving the SS a degree of financial
independence that would consolidate its political power. CALLUM MACDONALD, THE KILLING OF
SS OBERGRUPPENFUHRER REINHARD HEYDRICH 132-33 (1st American ed. 1989).
96. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 42-43.
97. Id. at 64.
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money for its operating budget.98 Impact has to launder drug money
itself in order to attract money launderers to its accounts.99 This tech-
nique, which Impact officials call "pickup," allows Impact to identify
money launderers and seize their assets. 00 In a telephone interview, an
unidentified Impact official explained that Impact's ratio of funds laun-
dered to funds seized was one-to-one, a ratio which the official called
"the best in the industry."1 ''
It is not just Impact's reliance on forfeiture as an organization that
raises suspicions about its motives; the compensation arrangement with
one of its founders appears to have been facially corrupt. Woody Kirk, a
retired customs officer and full-time consultant to Impact, originally had
a deal by which he received a twenty-five percent commission on all
assets he helped seize. 0 2 While the Justice Department put a stop to
Kirk's commissions, it apparently was unable to prevent him from
arranging for kickbacks from his network of informants.
10 3
Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey has cited Impact as an effective law
enforcement operation, but other law enforcement experts have stated
that Impact is an example of what has gone wrong in the pursuit of
criminal money.'0 4 Impact does not appear to be accountable to any
elected government body. Available information only indicates that
Impact is supervised by a "steering committee of state and local offi-
cials," and that its books are audited by the City of Coral Gables."0 5 It is
thus not clear whether any political body, such as the governing bodies
of Miami-Dade County or Coral Gables, would have the authority to
98. Kaplan, supra note 12.
99. Id.
100. Telephone Interview with unidentified Impact official (July 13, 2000).
101. Id. An unidentified Impact official explained that the "one-to-one ratio" means that South
Florida Impact generally seizes one million dollars for every one million dollars in drug money
that Impact launders.
102. Kaplan, supra note 12. This arrangement earned Kirk $625,000 in impact's first year of
existence. Id.
103. Id. According to Kaplan:
On learning of Kirk's commissions, the U.S. Justice Department threatened to cut
off all cooperation unless the commissions stopped. Impact complied, putting Kirk
on a retainer that pays him $10,666 each month. But Kirk's deals with informants
continued. In an interview, Kirk confirmed that, as the commissions ended, he asked
two of his informants to sign contracts pledging him a share of the 15 percent they
received as a reward from asset seizures. One agreement ... reveals that Kirk lent
the man $50,000 and, in return, was to receive 60 percent of the informant's reward




105. Id. Impact was invited by the author to meet for a personal interview in which this and
other matters might be clarified, but Impact did not respond to the invitation.
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"pull the plug" on Impact.1 6 Especially in light of Impact's broad and
amorphous jurisdictional sweep,"°7 the circumstances seem to add up to
a law enforcement task force that bears greater resemblance to a band of
roving "executive privateers" than it does to a law enforcement agency
or police department.108
To the average spectator, this might look like a chance for a slam
dunk for lawyers fighting the excesses of the drug war. But in the area
of civil forfeiture, past decisions indicate that one should beware of
assuming the obvious.' 0 9 The Supreme Court has, in fact, indicated
approval of the use of forfeiture as a revenue-generating mechanism for
law enforcement in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States.110
In a 5-4 opinion by Justice White, the Court stated that:
[t]he Government has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture that goes
beyond merely separating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains; that
legitimate interest extends to recovering all forfeitable assets, for
such assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-enforcement
efforts in a variety of important and useful ways .... The sums of
money that can be raised for law-enforcement activities this way are
substantial, and the Government's interest in using the profits of
crime to fund these activities should not be discounted. " '
The dissent's criticism of this point was mild, at best.
1 2
The argument could be made that, since Caplin was really about the
relationship of the Sixth Amendment to forfeited assets, the passage
quoted above is mere dicta; however, the language is unequivocal and
courts may be forced to engage in unabashed sophistry if they wish to
avoid it. One can only hope that the Supreme Court will reconsider its
endorsement of forfeiture as a revenue-generating tool if and when it is
106. It is clear, however, that federal law enforcement agencies such as the D.E.A. have
refused to continue cooperating with Impact. Kaplan, supra note 12.
107. For example, a small business in Oklahoma saw its bank account seized by Impact when a
Colombian client made a cash deposit into that account. Id.
108. In telephone discussions with the author, South Florida Impact officials deplored the
Kaplan article as having failed to report that South Florida Impact is one of the most effective law
enforcement units in the "industry." One official ascribed negative comments from other law
enforcement officials to "professional jealousy" of South Florida Impact's success. This
Comment submits that South Florida Impact seems to miss the point: under our Constitution, law
enforcement's effectiveness cannot be the only criteria for determining the validity of its methods.
Telephone Interviews with unidentified impact officials (July 13, 2000).
109. In light of Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), conventional wisdom held that, if
forfeiture against a guilty person could be an excessive fine, then any forfeiture against an
innocent person would have to be excessive. But that was before Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 (1996), was decided. See Stephen Chapman, Almost-Blind Justice: Sometimes, Even the
Innocent Are Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1996, at N27 available at 1996 WL 2650144.
110. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 629.
111. Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 640 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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faced squarely with the issue of whether such use of forfeiture violates
the nondelegation doctrine.
113
B. Is Civil Forfeiture Remedial or Punitive?
There are two types of forfeiture proceedings: civil and criminal.114
Under English law before the American Revolution, civil forfeitures
were only brought by the Crown in the Exchequer in matters concerning
the collection of revenue. Criminal forfeitures could only be brought in
the King's Bench pursuant to a criminal conviction."' As for our cur-
rent forfeiture statutes, only criminal forfeiture bears any resemblance to
its common law heritage.' 1 6 Civil forfeiture currently bears little resem-
blance to its common law ancestor because many civil forfeiture statutes
do not relate to any particular revenue interest that the government
might have in the property."
17
Both the civil and criminal forfeiture statutes contain a "relation
back" clause which provides for the vesting of title in the United States
at the time that the act giving rise to the forfeiture is committed. 1 8 The
criminal version provides an innocent owner defense for bona fide pur-
chasers, 119 whereas the civil version does not. The Supreme Court,
however, read such a defense for bona fide purchasers into the civil for-
feiture statute in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. 12
0
The most clear and pertinent distinctions between criminal and civil
forfeiture are that (1) a criminal forfeiture must be preceded by a convic-
tion, whereas a civil forfeiture is only against the property and is gener-
ally subject to a lower standard of proof; and (2) criminal forfeiture is
meant to be entirely punitive, whereas the constitutionality of civil for-
feiture is often justified by the government on grounds that it is more of
a remedial measure than a punitive one.' 2 ' The meaning of "punitive"
113. See discussion, infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
114. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881 (civil) with 21 U.S.C. § 853 (criminal).
115. See Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 299 (Lee, Attorney General, brief of).
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994).
117. See discussion, infra note 125.
118. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1994); 21 U.S.C. 881(h) (1994).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1994).
120. 507 U.S. 111 (1993) (stating that "neither the [1984] amendment nor the common-law
rule makes the Government an owner of property before forfeiture has been decreed"); see also 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)(1994).
121. Note the incoherence of the Court's discussion of this topic in Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 612-14 (1993), where the Court conflates the issues of revenue collection and
punishment of individuals for criminal acts. As noted by Solomon, supra note 93, the government
is somewhat ambivalent on the issue. In cases where the government loses money on forfeitures,
it posits that the purpose of forfeiture is punitive, whereas when forfeiture turns a profit, the
government claims that the purpose is pecuniary. See Solomon, supra note 93, at 1158-59.
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seems clear enough,' 22 but it would be helpful if the court provided an
objective definition of what "remedial" means, as well as guidelines that
would enable us to determine whether the punishment or remedy
imposed by a forfeiture is commensurate to the harm supposedly caused
by the offending property.
The problem has been, at least since the early history of our nation,
to clearly define the limitations of the term "remedial." '123 This proves
to be most problematic in areas where the property has been legally
acquired, is legal to possess, and is not subject to any tax or maritime
liens.' 24 Consistent holdings that legally obtained property can be sub-
ject to remedial forfeiture as an instrumentality of a crime have sent us
down a slippery slope from which it will be difficult to recover. 125 But,
despite the importance of understanding the limitations of remedial mea-
sures, the courts have given us little to no guidance. As one commenta-
tor has noted, the only reasoning the courts seem to provide is that
forfeiture is remedial whenever it is "not punishment."'
126
122. See Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified? 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 311 (1994). In setting the proper tone for how a free society can justify punishment,
Professor Pilon writes:
To violate a right ... is to create and incur an obligation to make one's victim whole
again.., to restore the equilibrium between the parties .... Thus does the world of
rights and obligations change by the commission of a tort or a crime; thus must it
change again if the moral world is to be set right.
Id. at 324-25. As shall be discussed, fitting consensual crimes into this moral calculus is a diffi-
cult task indeed, and it makes the remedial arguments for civil forfeiture in the drug war all the
harder to rationally justify.
123. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613-14.
124. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
125. Cases such as The Palmyra, set our nation's legal understanding of forfeiture off on a
wrong footing primarily due to a failure by the Court to apprehend the limitations of remedial
measures. As previously noted, the Court conflated the issues of forfeiture for purposes of
revenue enforcement (remedial forfeiture) and forfeiture for acts of piracy (criminal forfeiture).
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15. It is even more interesting to note that, thirty years
prior to The Palmyra decision, the executive branch took the position that a forfeiture that was not
brought to enforce the revenue laws could only be brought pursuant to a criminal conviction. See
La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 299. In reviewing these decisions, one can only conclude that
the Court was either not being careful, or that it had a secondary agenda, perhaps related to the
problems of privateering from foreign vessels that so bedeviled our ships at the time. Whatever
the case might have been, one cannot help but wonder whether we would be in the mess we now
find ourselves had the Court been more precise in those early cases.
126. See Piety, supra note 31. One conventional justification for civil forfeiture as a remedial
measure is the degree of harm caused to society by the illegal drug trade. But this argument
ignores the fact that legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco have been proven to be at least as
harmful, through deaths, addiction, lost productivity, etc., as illegal drugs. Yet no one has
suggested that the government should appropriate the property of Anheuser-Busch as a remedy for
alcoholism, nor that we should deprive Ben and Jerry's of its profits in response to obesity.
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C. Forfeiture and the Bill of Rights
A number of arguments contesting forfeiture have been raised
under the U.S. Constitution. The most crucial of those arguments are (1)
that forfeiture violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment;1 27 (2) that forfeiture violates the right to choice of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment; 128 (3) that forfeiture violates the Due Process;
Clause and Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 29
and (4) that it violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 1
3 0
Perhaps the most controversial opinions of the Court have sur-
rounded the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments,1 31 the most infamous of which is Bennis v. Michigan. 32 In order
to understand why the Court has upheld forfeitures in the face of clearly
unfair circumstances, it must be remembered that, first and foremost,
civil asset forfeiture is an action by the state against a thing.133 It is not
a proceeding against a person.' 34 Indeed, most civil asset forfeiture stat-
utes do not require any sort of proceeding against the owner at all, not
127. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
128. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
129. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
130. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
131. See, e.g., Bennis, 516 U.S. at 442.
132. Id.
133. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15. "The thing is here primarily considered
as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing .... [T]he proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam." Id.
The current Supreme Court is fond of quoting this passage from The Palmyra to justify many of
its current holdings on in rem civil asset forfeiture. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446-47. It is difficult
to understand why the Court insists on applying such a clearly archaic doctrine-especially one
which arose out of the necessities of securing -liens in maritime and assuring the collection of
import duties-to modem-day jurisprudence. As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissenting opinion
in Bennis, forfeiture evolved "from the necessity of finding some source of compensation for
injuries done by a vessel whose responsible owners were often half a world away and beyond the
practical reach of the law and its processes." Id. at 472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The holding of
the Court in The Palmyra suggests this very point. "In the judgment of this Court, no personal
conviction ... is necessary to enforce a forfeiture ... in cases of this nature." The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 15. In any case, as noted above the opinion explains that the power of in rem
forfeitures in England was created by statute "on the revenue side of the Exchequer." Id. This
implies that in rem forfeiture was created, in terms of State action, as a remedial measure for the
enforcement of customs laws, not for the forfeiture of personal vehicles used "in a criminal act in
the tangential way" that the Bennis' car was used. See Bennis, 516 'U.S. at 473 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
134. However, action against a person may be implicated in a criminal forfeiture proceeding.
In such cases, the owner must have already been convicted, and the State must still initiate a
separate action against the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994). See also The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 14 (explaining that, at common law, criminal forfeiture required a conviction
before the owner could be divested of his property).
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even a formal charge. 35 Even if the owner is completely innocent of
any wrongdoing, her property may be subject to forfeiture if the relevant
statute does not specifically provide for an innocent owner defense. 136
On the other hand, the Court has at least signalled that there are
some due process protections regarding forfeiture actions. In United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,137 the Court held that,
where the government seeks to seize property for purposes of asserting
ownership and control, its actions must conform to the requirements of
due process. 138 Absent exigent circumstances, the government violates
due process when it does not provide notice of the seizure to the
owner. 
39
In United States v. Ursery,4 ° the Court held that in rem forfeitures
did not constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 4 ' As in Bennis, the Court hung its
opinion upon the in rem fiction that the forfeiture action was a remedial
civil action against the property, not a punitive sanction against the indi-
vidual. 4 ' However, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in his partial dis-
sent, 14 3 this distinction was inconsistent with a line of cases beginning
with United States v. Halper,'" which established the following rule
respecting the relationship of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil
proceedings:
[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retrib-
utive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under-
135. With respect to federal civil forfeitures, the result has been that at least eighty percent of
all forfeitures involve owners against whom no criminal charges are ever brought. Blumenson &
Nilsen, supra note 23, at 77.
136. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 442 (1996). Tina Bennis jointly owned a used car with her
husband. Police caught her husband having sex with a prostitute in the car and forfeited the car on
grounds that it constituted a public nuisance. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture did not
violate Mrs. Bennis's constitutional rights to due process because of the in rem nature of the
proceeding. In other words, Mrs. Bennis's innocence was irrelevant because the car was guilty.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg made the startling argument that the Bennis's car was
worth such an insignificant amount of money that, after subtracting costs, there was "practically
nothing" to give Mrs. Bennis. Id. at 458. For an in-depth discussion of what could arguably be
called the Dred Scott of forfeiture cases, see Elizabeth B. Cain, Note, The Absurdity of Civil
Forfeiture Law Exposed Supreme Court Upholds Punishment of Innocent in Bennis v. Michigan
and Highlights the Need for Reform, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 667 (1998).
137. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
138. Id. at 52.
139. Id.
140. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
141. Id. at 292.
142. Id. at 278-79.
143. Id. at 305-306.
144. 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see also Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767
(1994); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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stand the term.... We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal pros-
ecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.'
4 5
As if such contradictions were insufficient to cloud the waters of
debate over whether civil forfeiture is punitive or remedial, there are
indications that the Eighth Amendment might end up being the horse to
upset the apple cart of forfeiture.146 In a line of cases beginning with
Austin v. United States,147 the Court has stated that a forfeiture that has a
partially punitive purpose is subject to scrutiny under the Excessive
Fines Clause. More recently, in United States v. Bajakajian,14 s the
Court took the unprecedented step of overturning a criminal forfeiture
on grounds that it constituted an excessive fine. Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Thomas first stated that, pursuant to the Court's holding in
Austin, even where a forfeiture's primary purpose is remedial, if a forfei-
ture is in any way meant to be punitive, it is subject to Eighth Amend-
ment scrutiny.' 49 Having laid this foundation, Thomas held that a
forfeiture may be deemed an excessive fine if the amount forfeited is
"grossly disproportionate" to the offense charged.1 51
A major problem with the Bajakajian holding, however, is that it
might have the unintentional effect of allowing the government to use
forfeiture more widely. 15 1 Also, the proportionality test, rather than pro-
viding an objective measure of whether forfeitures are excessive, will be
subject to how individual judges view certain offenses. 152  The most
important question that this line of cases leaves unanswered is whether
the Eighth Amendment affords greater protection to convicted offenders
whose property is subject to criminal forfeiture than it does to those
145. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 306 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also Ex Parte Kelley, No. 1971725, at 1, June 11, 1999
WL 378606 (Ala. 1999).
147. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
148. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
149. Id. at 329 n.4.
150. Id. at 334.
151. See Melissa A. Rolland, Comment, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1399 (1999).
152. See Ex Parte Kelley, No. 191725, 1999 WL 378606, at *1 (Ala. June 11, 1999).
Comparing the majority opinion with that of the dissent, it is clear that cases such as these will be
decided according to how seriously individual judges view the underlying offense; see also One
1995 Toyota Pick-up Truck v. District of Colombia, 718 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1998) (holding that,
where claimant had been arrested for solicitation offense, the fine for which was $150, forfeiture
of pick-up truck worth $15,500 was an excessive fine for purposes of the Eighth Amendment).
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whose property is subject to civil forfeiture.1 53 In this respect, the courts
have painted themselves into a corner, because it is patently unjust to
say that an innocent owner-or at least, an owner who is never charged
with a crime-does not deserve at least the same degree of protection as
the person who actually uses the property in connection with an offense
for which he is convicted. This dilemma highlights the absurdity of the
taint doctrine, and why that doctrine's applicability to modern jurispru-
dence needs to be reconsidered.
54
IV. THE CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM ACT OF 2000:
PROCEDURAL REMEDIES
The Reform Act was the culmination of seven years of effort,
mainly on the part of Congressman Henry Hyde (R. Ill.).'" Rep. Hyde
stated that he first became aware of the abuses of civil forfeiture laws
through the reporting of Stephen Chapman of the Chicago Tribune.' 56
By 1993, Rep. Hyde had introduced a reform bill into Congress; 57 how-
ever, it took until the spring of 2000 for a final bill to pass both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. 58 A group of organizations
that spanned the ideological spectrum from the American Civil Liberties
153. Compare Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (husband arrested for solicitation, but
innocent wife-owner of car unable to contest in rem forfeiture of said car), with One 1995 Toyota
Pick-up Truck, 718 A.2d at 558 (owner arrested for solicitation, but forfeiting his pick-up truck
deemed excessive fine) and United States v. (1) $398,950 in U.S. Currency, Nos. 87-0263-Civ-
Hofveler 1999 WL 984424 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (distinguishing Bajakajian on grounds that it was a
criminal forfeiture, whereas in the instant case the forfeiture proceeded in rem against the currency
itself). But see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
is applicable to in rem civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)).
154. As a result of this strange disparity in which criminals have greater constitutional
protections than owners of property forfeited in rem, we have ended up 180 degrees from the
government's position in United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 297 (1796).
155. See 146 Cong.Rec. H2040-01, 2046 (delayed Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
156. Id. Mr. Chapman wrote a series of stories reporting a number of particularly harsh
applications of state and federal forfeiture laws. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, The Awful Price of
Fighting the War on Drugs, CHI. TRIB. May 21, 1992, at C23 available at 1992 WL 4484289.
157. See Stephen Chapman, A Weapon in the Drug War Provokes Growing Disgust, CHI.
TRIB., July 1, 1993, at N23 available at 1993 WL 11080888.
158. Civil Arrest Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(114 Stat 202) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C.,
28 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.). The final bill was a far cry from what many organizations had been
working toward. See Comments of F.E.A.R. at http://www.fear.org/whatview.html. After the
House passed H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999), which would have, among other things, raised
the government's burden of proof to the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard, Senators
Sessions (R. Ala.), Feinstein (D. Cal.) and Schumer (D. N.Y.) introduced S. 1701, 106th Cong.
(1999). S. 1701 was generally believed to have been written by the Justice Department, and many
analysts agreed that it would have actually made the law on forfeiture worse that it was. See
Brenda Grantland, Chart comparing H.R. 1658 with S. 1701, available at http://www.fear.org/




Union to the National Rifle Association joined Rep. Hyde in his pursuit
of a reform bill, indicating that forfeiture had garnered a long list of
enemies. '5 9
The 1999 House version of the Reform Act 6° contained eight pro-
visions which Rep. Hyde believed to be important: (1) shifting the bur-
den of proof so that once a claimant challenged a forfeiture, the
government would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the property was subject to forfeiture; (2) providing a universal innocent
owner defense for all federal forfeitures; (3) providing counsel for indi-
gents faced with forfeiture proceedings; (4) a provision requiring the
release of property pending a final outcome if the government's contin-
ued possession was likely to cause a substantial hardship on the property
owner; (5) eliminating the cost bond requirement; (6) amending the Tort
Claims Act to allow claimants to sue the government for property
destroyed while in the government's possession; (7) extending the dead-
line by which an owner must challenge a forfeiture; and (8) awarding
post-judgment and, in some cases, pre-judgment interest to those prop-
erty owners who prevail against the government.1 61 This Part will dis-
cuss the extent to which these various key provisions were incorporated
into the final version of the Reform Act, as well as a couple of other
interesting provisions and their likely effects.
A. A Review of Some Key Components of the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000:
1. BURDEN OF PROOF
Prior to the Reform Act, t62 once the government had shown proba-
ble cause that a property was subject to forfeiture, the burden of proof
fell on the owner contesting the forfeiture to show, by a preponderance
159. Among the organizations thanked by Rep. Hyde were the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Americans for Tax Reform, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Rifle Association, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Realtors,
the Credit Union National Association, the American Bankers Association, the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, the National Association of Home Builders, the Boat Owners Association
of the United States, United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Apartment Association,
the American Hotel and Motel Association, and Brenda Grantland of Forfeiture Endangers
American Rights ("F.E.A.R."), who worked for years to get a reform bill passed. See Cong. Rec.
H2040.01, 2046-47 (delayed, Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
160. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999).
161. Id. See also Statement of Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Forfeiture
Reform: Now or Never? CATO INSTrrUTE, May 3, 1999, available at http://www.aclu.org/
congress/050399a.html.
162. President Clinton signed the Reform Act into law on April 25, 2000. By its terms, the
Reform Act was to have taken effect 120 days thereafter, which would have been on or about
August 23, 2000. Pub. L. No., 106-185, § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat 202, 225) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983).
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of the evidence, that the property was not subject to forfeiture. 163 As
such, the government could meet its burden without obtaining a criminal
conviction against the owner or even charging the owner with a
crime. 164 In fact, once the government had seized the property, its bur-
den of probable cause was already met, and the government could sim-
ply sit and wait for the claimant to prove his case.
165
The House Judiciary Committee found, quite correctly, that this
burden required the owner to prove a negative, 66 while the government
was required to prove almost nothing. 167 By contrast, the committee
noted, some states required the prosecution to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt,'68 while others required clear and convincing evi-
dence before property would be forfeited.
169
The Reform Act remedies this inequity under federal law by forc-
ing the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is subject to forfeiture. 170 This represents a compromise from
the "clear and convincing" standard of Rep. Hyde's original bill,1 7' but
is a move in the right direction. Nevertheless, this low evidentiary
threshold still leaves the door open for abuse. Especially because law
enforcement will continue to have a pecuniary interest in forfeited pro-
ceeds, there is little reason to think that this slightly higher burden of
proof will cause law enforcement officials to shift their emphasis from
seizing property and cash to fighting dangerous criminals.
The Attorney General and the Justice Department argued that pre-
ponderance of the evidence was the correct standard because it is the
163. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1999).
164. Report of the Judiciary Committee, 69006, 106th Congress Report, House of
Representatives, 1st Session, 106-192, at 11 n.47.
165. Id.
166. Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1999), the claimant had to prove the "innocent owner"
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, to wit, that the act subjecting the property to
forfeiture was committed without the owner's knowledge or consent.
167. Report of the Judiciary Committee, supra note 164, at 12 n.48.
168. Id. at 13 n.53 (citing A 1983 Volkswagen v. County of Washoe, 699 P.2d 108, 109 (Nev.
1985)).
169. See, e.g., Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 967 (Fla. 1991)
(holding that the Florida Constitution "requires substantial burdens of proof where state action
may deprive individuals of basic rights"). Of course, with the availability of federal adoptive
forfeitures facilitating the circumvention state forfeiture laws, there is no reason why a local police
department should have to concern itself with such substantial burdens of proof.
170. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114
Stat 202, 205-06) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)).
171. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999) provided for a "clear and convincing" evidentiary burden.
The compromise arose from the fact that "preponderance of the evidence" standard appeared to be




standard used in other civil proceedings. 172 This argument exhibits an
almost laughable contempt for reality. At best, forfeiture is used most
often as a proxy for punishing those who are suspected of engaging in
criminal activity. At worst, forfeiture is used strictly as means for gener-
ating revenue. Both of these inferences are supported by the fact that
approximately eighty percent of people whose assets are seized and for-
feited are never charged with a crime.173 Thus, the only meaningful
reform would be to require that (1) forfeited assets be deposited into a
general treasury fund instead of being funneled to the seizing agency,
and (2) a forfeiture can only occur pursuant to a criminal conviction. 74
In addition to shifting the burden of proof onto the government in
general terms, the Reform Act requires that "if the Government's theory
of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the
commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of
a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a sub-
stantial connection between the property and the offense."' 75 This lan-
guage looks good on its face, and was probably needed to set a uniform
standard across the country. 17 6 The precise meaning of "substantial con-
nection," however, will be hard for courts to quantify, and it may be that
one judge's "substantial connection" will be another judge's "fortuitous"
or "incidental" connection.
The problem with setting reasonable, bright-line rules is a difficulty
that is inherent in the taint doctrine itself: if property becomes tainted by
its association with a crime, how tainted does it have to be in order for it
to be subject to forfeiture? 177 The lack of a clear, principled answer to
172. See Weekly Media Briefing with Attorney General Janet Reno, Justice Department,
Washington, D.C., available on Federal News Service, June 24, 1999.
173. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 77 n.155.
174. See id. at n.152.
175. Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 206) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)) (emphasis added).
176. Many courts require there to be a substantial connection. See, e.g., United States v. 28
Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Forfeiture, Stop Six Center, 781 F.
Supp. 1200, 1205-06 (N.D. Tex. 1991); United States v. 26.075 Acres, Located in Swift Creek
Township, 687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d
1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989). Others do not. The Seventh Circuit has ruled that the facilitating
property need only have "more than an incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity."
United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Born
v. United States 498 U.S. 1126 (1991). See also United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258, 1269 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that the test is "sufficient nexus").
177. For a full discussion of the broad range of standards and circumstances by which courts
have found property to have been sufficiently tainted to invoke forfeiture, see 146 Cong.Rec. at
H2050-51 (2000). Significantly, Congress notes that "[i]n one area in particular, courts have been
much too liberal in finding facilitation. An especially high standard should have to be met before
we dispossess a person or family of their home. A primary residence should be accorded far
greater protection than mere personal property." Id.
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this question highlights the need to reconsider the validity of the taint
doctrine.
2. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
One of the major reasons that so few forfeitures are challenged is
the arduous procedures and expense of challenging the forfeiture, partic-
ularly when the seizure may leave the owner without resources with
which to fight the forfeiture.' 78 This problem is compounded by the fact
that there is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel for indi-
gents in civil forfeiture cases, because they are not threatened with
imprisonment.17 9 The House Judiciary Committee concluded that "civil
forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in nature that appointed counsel
should be made available for those who are indigent, or made indigent
by a seizure, in appropriate circumstances."'8 0
As a result of these findings, the original House version of the
Reform Act contained a provision for the appointment of counsel for
indigents in civil forfeiture cases.181 The criteria for determining who
should be appointed counsel included whether or not the person had
standing to bring the claim and whether the claim had been brought in
good faith."8 2 As a result of Senate compromises, however, the Reform
Act in its final form does very little in this regard because, with respect
to claims on personal property, the Reform Act limits appointment of
counsel to those who are already represented by appointed counsel "in
connection with a related criminal case."' 83 This almost defeats the pur-
pose of the measure, as it grants criminal defendants greater protection
than claimants not charged with any crime. This may give police and
prosecutors more incentives to pursue civil forfeitures than to prosecute
criminals, because there will still be fewer barriers between the police
and a briefcase full of cash than stand in the way of winning a convic-
tion against an individual.
The Reform Act does, however, offer the appointment of counsel to
indigents where the property subject to forfeiture is real property used
by the indigent person as a primary residence.' 84 This seems to reflect a
general policy concern, noted frequently in the record, that homes
178. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1989) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment does not protect against the forfeiture of assets used to pay attorney's fees).
179. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 164, at 14 n.55 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 14.
181. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999).
182. Id.
183. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114
Stat. 202, 205) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1)).
184. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 205) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(2)).
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should be given greater protection than personal property. 185 How much
meaning this will have in the real world, of course, remains to be seen.
It seems likely that this will channel police toward placing a greater
emphasis on seizing cash, cars and other personal property.
3. INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE
Bennis v. Michigan186 demonstrated that the Supreme Court, on
grounds that the in rem fiction made the guilt or innocence of the owner
irrelevant to the property's guilt, would not read an innocent owner
defense into any civil forfeiture provision that did not specifically pro-
vide one. With respect to federal forfeiture laws, however, the impact of
Bennis was limited because most federal statutes explicitly provided for
an innocent owner defense.187 Many other federal forfeiture statutes
contain no such defense.' 88
The Reform Act provides a uniform innocent owner defense for all
federal civil forfeiture proceedings.189 It defines an innocent owner as
one who either "did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfei-
ture" or, upon learning of the conduct, did "all that reasonably could be
expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the prop-
erty."' 90 Ways of demonstrating that an owner did "all that reasonably
could be expected under circumstances" may include timely notification
of law enforcement authorities, and/or reasonable good faith efforts to
terminate the illicit use of the property. 91 The owner is not required to
take steps that would endanger anybody other than the person whose
conduct gives rise to the forfeiture.1 92 This provision might help protect
landlords who, in some jurisdictions, may not be able to evict a tenant
until after that tenant has been convicted of a crime.
193
The Reform Act also contains a protection against potential rela-
tion-back hazards, stating that an "innocent owner" is also a person who,
at the time he acquired the interest in the property, "was a bona fide
purchaser or seller for value (including a purchaser or seller of goods or
services for value) and did not know and was reasonably without cause
185. See 146 Cong.Rec. at H2050-51 (2000).
186. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
187. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 164, at 14 n.58 and accompanying
text.
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1999).




193. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 164, at 14 and text accompanying
n.66.
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to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture."'1 94 This provision
is in part intended to prevent criminals from making fraudulent, gratui-
tous transfers to innocent family members. 195
An otherwise valid claim under the foregoing subsection will not be
denied for lack of consideration if (1) the property is the claimant's pri-
mary residence, (2) the claimant has no reasonable alternative means of
shelter, (3) "the property is not, and is not traceable to, the proceeds of
any criminal offense," and (4)
the claimant acquired his or her interest in the property through mar-
riage, divorce, or legal separation, or the claimant was the spouse or
legal dependent of a person whose death resulted in the transfer of the
property to the claimant through inheritance or probate, except that
the court shall limit the value of any real property interest for which
innocent ownership is recognized under this subparagraph to the
value necessary to maintain reasonable shelter in the community for
such claimant and all dependents residing with the claimant.
196
At first glance, this looks like a reasonable provision for protecting
the widows, divorcees, and dependent orphans of drug dealers from
being rendered homeless by the forfeiture of their residences. But the
third part, which provides that the property cannot be, or be traced to,
"the proceeds of any criminal offense" is troubling because it looks like
a strict liability provision that defeats the entire purpose of the innocent
owner defense. Indeed, this provision engages the reader in a bit of
circular logic, because, if the property is not traceable to the proceeds of
a criminal offense, then it is unlikely that the property would be subject
to forfeiture at all unless it was used in substantial connection to facili-
tate the offense 197 (which would tend to call into doubt the innocence of
any cohabitating family members).
This provision also calls into the question the very purpose of the
forfeiture. If the purpose is to punish the criminal, or to at least deprive
him of the fruits of illicit activity, then it makes no sense to deprive
innocent family members of the property once the criminal is dead or
otherwise no longer in possession of the property. The original House
version of the Reform Act provided that the person inheriting the prop-
erty could prove innocent ownership by demonstrating that, at the time
he acquired the property, he was reasonably without cause to believe
that the property was subject to forfeiture. 198 This would have been a
194. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 206) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)).
195. Report of the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 164, at 16-17.
196. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 206-07) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(d)(3)(B)(1994)).
197. See discussion supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
198. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999).
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reasonable provision to include in the final version of the bill, one that
could have protected innocent family members from losing their
homes. 199
4. HARDSHIP PROVISION
Prevailing against the government in a forfeiture proceeding would
be a hollow victory if, during the time that the government held the
property following the seizure, the owner has suffered irreparable dam-
age due to lost business or other hardship. The Reform Act attempts to
protect against this eventuality by providing that the property may be
released immediately to the claimant if (1) the claimant has a possessory
interest; (2) the claimant has sufficient ties to the community to assure
the availability of the property; (3) the continued possession by the gov-
ernment would cause a substantial hardship, such as the loss of business,
work, or leaving the claimant homeless; and (4) the substantial hardship
outweighs the likelihood that the property will be lost, damaged, con-
cealed, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of during the pendency of a
forfeiture proceeding. 2" The foregoing only applies if the property is
not contraband or funds, unless those funds constitute "the assets of a
legitimate business which has been seized," if the property is not to be
used as evidence of a violation of the law, or if, "by reason of design or
other characteristic, [the property] is particularly suited for use in illegal
activities," or if the property "is likely to be used to commit additional
criminal acts if returned to the claimant."
20 1
This reform appears laudable on its face. Like other provisions,
however, it seems to underscore a more troubling aspect of civil asset
forfeiture: that civil forfeiture is often used as a proxy for a criminal
prosecution. This once again underscores the absurdity of the taint doc-
trine. For example, if the government has evidence that a business
owner has committed a crime, then why not arrest the business owner
instead of "arresting" his property? On the other hand, if the govern-
ment does not have sufficient evidence to build a criminal case against
the business owner, the government should not be able to punish that
person by seizing his or her property. One could only believe otherwise
if one were to accept that property can be "guilty" of criminal activity
entirely apart from the culpability of its owner.
199. This Comment recognizes the cynical response to this argument, which is that spouses are
never ignorant of the sources of their families' income. This Comment simply believes that the
adage, "never say never," has some bearing on such circumstances, and that fundamental justice
requires that a spouse not be presumed guilty by association.
200. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 208) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(1)).
201. Id. at 209 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(1)(E)(8)).
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5. COMPENSATION
Successful claimants have been frustrated in their attempts to get
compensation for damage caused to their property while the government
had possession during the pendency of a forfeiture. In 1989, customs
agents seized and fruitlessly searched a brand new twenty-nine-foot sail-
boat for drugs.2" 2 The search destroyed the sailboat's gas tank and its
engine, and damaged its woodwork, resulting in damages to the sailboat
of over $30,000.203 After finding that federal law prohibited the govern-
ment from paying him damages, the owner sold the boat for scrap.2"4 A
private bill eventually brought the owner a mere $8,900, the amount he
needed to repay his boat loan.2 °5
The Reform Act would amend the Federal Tort Claims Act 20 6 to
provide for tort claims against the U.S. government for the injury or loss
of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of any
law enforcement officer if the property was seized for purposes of for-
feiture, if the property was not forfeited, and if the claimant was not
convicted for a crime giving rise to the forfeiture.20 7 The potential
impact of the phrase, "if the property was seized for purposes of forfei-
ture," is unclear. It seems that law enforcement could easily get around
this language if they first seize property as evidence, and initiate the
forfeiture proceedings only later.
The Reform Act also provides for an award of attorney's fees,
costs, and post-judgment interest in the event that the claimant should
"substantially prevail" against the government in a forfeiture proceed-
ing.2°8 The precise meaning of "substantially prevail" is also unclear. It
could mean either that a claimant came close to winning, or that the
government did not have much of a case against the property (although
the latter is more likely). It would have been better to have simply used
the word "prevail" without any qualifier, because it seems likely that
courts will develop inconsistent standards for the meaning of the term
"substantially."
6. ELIMINATING THE COST BOND
Under recent law, a claimant contesting a forfeiture had to post a
cost bond in the amount of $5,000 or ten percent of the seized property's





206. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
207. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 211) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)),
208. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 212) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2645(b)(1)).
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value, whichever was less, but not less than $250.209 The potential
effect of deterring indigents from even trying to contest forfeitures was
obvious. Indeed, the Report of the House Judiciary Committee con-
cluded that the bond was "unconstitutional in cases involving indigents,
because it would deprive such claimants of hearings simply because of
their inability to pay. 210 The Reform Act eliminates the cost bond
entirely.21 1
7. NOTICE AND SET-ASIDE PROVISIONS
The Reform Act calls for the government to notify an owner of a
seizure within sixty days, with some possibilities for extension, unless in
the interim the government initiates a forfeiture action and provides
notice to the owner.212 Once notice has been provided, the claimant has
at least thirty-five days in which to challenge the forfeiture.213 This pro-
cedure has been viewed as necessary because, under the former rules, a
claimant often had little or no time to adequately contest a forfeiture
after receiving notice.214
If the government fails to provide notice, the owner can enter a
motion to set aside the forfeiture. 215 The court can then order the gov-
ernment to return the property to the owner without prejudice to the
goverment's ability to initiate a forfeiture at a later time.21 6 This is
unfortunate, as the original House version of the bill provided that fail-
ure of notice would result in dismissal of the government's claim with
prejudice. 2 17 The final version might allow the government to continu-
ally harass a property owner ad infinitum, or at least until the end of the
expanded statute of limitations provided in the Reform Act.2 18
8. OTHER INTERESTING PROVISIONS
Because civil asset forfeiture is a civil proceeding, a claimant has
access to all the discovery tools of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
At least with respect to discovery, this places a claimant in a far better
position than a criminal defendant in the federal system. Congress has
seen fit to alter this balance by allowing the government to move for a
209. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1999).
210. Rep. of the H.R. Judiciary Comm., supra note 164, at 18 n.73 (citing Wiren v. Eide, 542
F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1976)).
211. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 204) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(E)).
212. Id. at 202-03 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)).
213. Id.
214. See David B. Smith, supra note 25, at 9.03(1), 9-44-9-45.
215. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 207-08) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)).
216. Id.
217. H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999).
218. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 217) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1621).
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stay of forfeiture proceedings in order to avoid causing prejudice to a
pending criminal case.219 On the other hand, the Reform Act allows a
claimant to do likewise if allowing the forfeiture proceeding to go for-
ward might burden his right against self-incrimination. 220 A court may
also choose to issue a protective order limiting the scope of discovery
instead of granting a stay.221
In Degen v. United States, 222 the Supreme Court declined to apply
the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine" to forfeiture cases where a crimi-
nal defendant is unavailable to face criminal charges. The Court's rea-
soning was that the absence of a fugitive did not remove jurisdiction
over the property from the court, and that the fugitive's challenge of the
forfeiture did not in any way prejudice the government's ability to have
a judgment enforced. 223 The Court found that the government was on
stronger ground in arguing that discovery in the proceeding might
prejudice a concurrent criminal case; there was no reason, however, why
a court could not issue protective orders to limit the scope of discov-
ery.224 The Reform Act overrules Degen by instating the applicability of
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to civil forfeiture cases,225 thus con-
fronting claimants with the choice between giving up their property or
facing criminal charges.
One of the most difficult aspects of studying current forfeiture pol-
icy is the lack of information from the government about how much it
collects annually in forfeited assets. 226 The Reform Act attempts to rem-
edy this with a provision entitled "Enhanced Visibility of the Asset For-
feiture Program. ' 227 This provision calls for an annual report from the
Attorney General which would show a break-down of assets deposited
by state of deposit, total expenses paid from the fund, as well as other
reporting and auditing requirements.228 If nothing else, this will provide
some measure of accountability as to how assets are disbursed. More
importantly, it will provide concerned citizens a better understanding of
how much the cost of government is being externalized from the politi-
cal process.22 9
219. Id. at 215 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1)).
220. Id. at 216 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2)).
221. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(3)).
222. 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
223. Id. at 825.
224. Id. at 826.
225. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 219) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2466).
226. As previously noted, the Justice Department has not provided an audit of its forfeiture
fund since 1996. See Dillon, supra note 11.
227. § 2, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat. at 223-24) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(e)(6)).
228. Id.
229. See discussion, infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
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V. LOOSE ENDS: WHAT THE REFORM ACT DOES NOT ADDRESS.
When a law and order Congress passes reform legislation by such
an impressive margin, one ought to step back and inquire as to whether
perhaps more is happening than meets the eye, and whether the Reform
Act itself is mere slight of hand to obscure some other purpose. The
intentions of the Reform Act would appear to withstand this scrutiny;
however, despite its laudable procedural reforms, it leaves a lot of busi-
ness yet to be done. While it raises the government's burden of proof,
for example, the Reform Act only moderately clarifies, and does not
attempt to seriously justify, the continued use of the taint doctrine. Con-
sensual behavior does not provide us with a clarified wrong against
which we can measure a remedy, which leads to the ultimate conclusion
that ending the drug war (as well as prohibitions against other consen-
sual behavior) is the only rational way to reform civil asset forfeiture.
Given the likelihood that the drug war will continue into the indefinite
future, the Reform Act will not cure the problems inherent in a policy
that allows a roving executive branch to generate revenues by means
which are outside the normal democratic processes of political accounta-
bility. Without addressing these fundamental concerns, the relationship
among our democratic institutions, our laws, and our consumption of
public goods such as law enforcement2 30 are in danger of becoming
increasingly irrational.
A. Forfeiture and the "Taint" Doctrine: A Remedy in
Search of a Wrong
One particularly troublesome aspect of civil asset forfeiture is the
apparent strict liability which attaches to the property once it has been
"tainted" by being either the proceeds or instrumentality of criminal con-
duct, or by the mere presence of illegal substances or instrumentalities.
Whereas our traditional system of criminal justice attaches guilt or inno-
cence to the person, the taint doctrine attaches guilt to the property itself,
and therefore the guilt or innocence of the owner can easily be irrele-
vant.2 3 1 Although the Reform Act makes it clear that an innocent owner,
or an owner who did "all that could reasonably be done" to prevent the
property from being used illegally, may successfully challenge a forfei-
ture, it will still not be entirely clear what act or acts an owner must
230. For a discussion on why law enforcement is a "public good," see Joseph E. Kennedy,
Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality
in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665 (1997).
231. Although the Reform Act would place this burden back onto the government, to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture, the taint doctrine still
manifests an erosion of the presumption of innocence.
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undertake to prevent the property from being subject to forfeiture.
Moreover, although the Reform Act establishes a higher burden on the
government to prove that the property "is subject to forfeiture," it does
not sufficiently address the problems inherent in the taint doctrine itself,
thereby leaving the system open for continued abuse.
The taint doctrine also has implications for the presumption of
innocence on which our system of criminal jurisprudence is based.232
Civil forfeiture has often been justified by its proponents as an effective
tool for "separating criminals" from the proceeds of their criminal enter-
prises.23 3 A criminal, so the conventional wisdom goes, fears losing his
money, his house, and his expensive cars more than he fears going to
jail. 234 But this reasoning presupposes, as a first matter, that the owner
of the subject property is "criminal." It is therefore important to answer
this question: from where does the government's power to label some-
one a "criminal" emanate? The answer is that such power can only ema-
nate from a properly conducted criminal trial, in which the jury converts
the criminal defendant from a person who is "presumed innocent" to one
who has been proven guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt.
235
It necessarily follows, then, that the government lacks the power to
label anyone a "criminal" who has not been duly prosecuted and found
guilty for the charged offense. In this regard, the proponents of civil
asset forfeiture as a tool for law enforcement ignore the presumption of
innocence, and have thus turned upside down the rationale- which has
long stood behind that presumption: that the power of the state to deter-
mine who is guilty of a crime should not be arbitrary. Thus, by labeling
individuals as "criminal" as a pretext for seizing and forfeiting their
assets, the state usurps the presumption of innocence, a fundamental cor-
nerstone of our jurisprudential heritage, and replaces it with an arbitrary
exercise of state will that is repugnant to our system of political beliefs.
232. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 8 (1994).
233. See Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture Is Reasonable, and It Works, CRIM. L. PROC. NEWS,
(Federalist Society) Vol. 1, No. 2 (1997).
234. Id. Cassella's reasoning here is patently fraudulent. He has never cited a survey or other
study which empirically backs his assertion. In point of fact, his assertion flies in the face of what
is common knowledge about the role of forfeitures in plea-bargaining, where prosecutors agree
not to prosecute in exchange for defendants' agreement not to challenge forfeitures of their
property. See Smith, supra note 25, at I 10.06(3)(e), 10-100.22(5)-24. Moreover, the value that
individuals place on their freedom of movement vis-a-vis their property is not for Cassella or
anybody else in the government to presuppose, because the two are inextricably intertwined. Our
democracy is simply based on the fundamental principle that freedom is the highest possible state
of being for human individuals to live under, and that ownership and control of property is a vital
expression of that freedom. See Pilon, supra note 122, at 322-23. Whether the government puts
one in jail, or takes one's property, the government has taken one's freedom, and therefore has
exercised its ultimate power (short of taking life, which is another form of taking away freedom).
235. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
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Of course, the proponents of civil forfeiture will reply to this argu-
ment that, because civil forfeiture is a proceeding in rem, the guilt or
innocence of the owner is irrelevant.236 But such circular reasoning
stoops to an unseemly level of intellectual dishonesty because it ignores
the punitive nature of in rem forfeiture.237 Worst still, civil forfeiture in
drug cases seeks to penalize individuals for wrongs that are impossible
to quantify because those "wrongs" are grounded in consensual behavior
that the state has declared illegal through the raw exercise of political
power. 218 Roger Pilon correctly points out that when consensual activi-
ties are criminalized, "the task of crafting principled remedies is made
impossible, for there is no victim to come forward, no wrong from
which to derive a remedy. 239 With no wrongs against which to mea-
sure the remedies, those remedies become widely varied, because "in the
end they reflect little more than moral outrage at unpopular behavior,"
and, indeed, they become "remedies for nothing."24
As has been noted, civil in rem forfeiture was historically justified
as a measure for enforcing customs laws. In an era in which the govern-
ment relied heavily on customs revenue, it was rational and just for the
government to base the seizure of goods for customs violations on the
notion that the government had a "property interest" in goods that were
subject to customs duties.2 4 1
Today, asset forfeiture is aimed only at disgorging a particular
pathology of prohibition, that of extraordinary street profits.242 Outrage
at the amounts of wealth amassed by drug dealers is misplaced because
we, as a nation, have only made such wealth possible through prohibi-
tion. Such outrage is therefore a poor platform from which to rationally
consider our drug policy. Thus, the ultimate civil asset forfeiture reform
measure would be to dispose of the drug war altogether.
236. Indeed, this was precisely the rationale behind the court's decision in Bennis v. Michigan,
516 U.S. 442 (1996).
237. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611-14. But see id. at 618 (stating rather incoherently that "[i]n
sum, even though this Court has rejected the "innocence" of the owner as a common-law defense
to forfeiture, it consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the
owner.").
238. While this Comment posits that the early Supreme Court, in cases such as La Vengeance,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) and The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827), mistakenly conflated
the issues of common law criminal forfeiture and in rem forfeiture, it should be pointed out that
those cases involved acts of piracy: acts which at least bore the arguable substance of wrongs for
which the government could permit a remedy.
239. See Pilon, supra note 122, at 328.
240. Id. at 328-29.
241. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
242. The retail markup on black-market drugs has been estimated at anywhere from 5,000 to
20,000 percent. See Robert Sweet, NAT. REv., Feb. 12, 1996, at 44-45 available at http://www.
nationalreview.com/12feb96/drug.html.
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B. The Problem of Externalizing the Cost of a Public Good
In recognition of the political reality that drug prohibition is
unlikely to end in the near future, it is appropriate to consider some
issues for future efforts at reform. Although its purported intent may
have been to deprive drug dealers of the fruits and instrumentalities of
their activities, as it is practiced by the government, forfeiture is, for all
intents and purposes, a means of raising revenue,243 and it will most
likely continue to be so in a post-Reform Act world. Eric Blumenson
and Eva Nilsen have argued that this particular feature of the current law
of forfeiture, beyond its obvious corruptive potential, violates the consti-
tutional separation of powers as contained in the Appropriations Clause
of Article 1.244 This argument is sound, and is worth exploring in a
litigation context.
Because 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(B) mandates the depositing of for-
feited proceeds directly into the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture
Fund, the core congressional power found in the Appropriations Clause
is bypassed in favor of an agency of the executive branch raising its own
revenue and setting its own budget.245 But since Congress granted this
power to the Justice Department, the question becomes whether this was
an impermissible delegation of a core congressional power. The
nondelegation doctrine provides that "so long as Congress provides an
administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a
court could ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, no
delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principle of separa-
tion of powers has occurred. ' 246 However, "[i]f some delegations of
legislative power are constitutionally suspect, giving law enforcement
agencies the opportunity to set the size of their own budgets through
police seizures must be one of them. '2 47
The nondelegation concerns on this point are compelling, and, by
themselves, should be sufficient for finding that asset forfeiture in a
post-Reform Act world would still be unconstitutional. Nevertheless,
implicit in these arguments is an important policy matter which must be
examined, one which takes into account the externality effect 248 of fund-
243. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629.
244. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 84-100. The Constitution provides: "No
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law;
and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7.
245. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 84-85.
246. Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
247. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 88.
248. The meaning of the term "externality" has been much debated by economists over the
century, and the question still seems unsettled. We will not involve ourselves in that debate,
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ing significant government operations, such as law enforcement, with
assets forfeited from individuals.
If indeed it is agreed upon that drugs must be illegal, the logic of
making drug trafficking unprofitable is compelling. The power con-
ferred by drug profits is well-known, and has proven to be highly corro-
sive to the rule of law wherever illegal drug markets exist.
24 9
Complications arise, however, when a government declares an interest
in those profits through forfeiture, especially when the government is
not required to pursue a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to forfei-
ture. Through a perverse irony, the government soon finds that it has a
financial interest in the profitability of the drug market, and, therefore, a
fiscal stake in keeping drugs illegal. Law enforcement agencies that
depend on drug asset forfeiture come to have their own stake in the
profitability of illegal drugs. In fact, one of the key measures of the
success of drug interdiction efforts-driving up the street price of
drugs-has an additional ironic effect of making black market trading in
drugs even more profitable for those who remain market players.250 The
end result is that law enforcement develops a stronger stake in not win-
ning the drug war than in winning the drug war.
The second prong of this problem is that, because dependence on
forfeiture causes the funding of law enforcement to become detached
from legislative accountability,51 the body politic has no sense of the
because the meaning in terms of the law seems pretty clear: An externality occurs where one
derives a benefit for which one has not paid, but somebody else had (in other words, the cost of
that benefit has not been internalized). Some of the most common examples the impact of
externalities in our legal history come from the common law of property. For example, a factory
might decide that it can produce a good more cheaply if it pollutes the environment. Thus, the
cost of producing the good "cleanly" is not internalized, and the cost of making it cheaply is
externalized onto the environment and the surrounding community, and the factory will have to
pay damages to its neighbors as a way of fully internalizing the costs of its manufacturing
processes. It is not only possible to derive external benefits, but also to confer them. An example
might be a property owner whose investment in a drainage system benefits his neighbors.
249. Perhaps the notion that drug money creates a public nuisance through its corruptive power
on local politicians and law enforcement presents a stronger remedial argument for forfeiting drug
profits than those arguments in which the Court has indulged. The problem is that the influence of
drug money is so pervasive that it cannot possibly be abated without some fundamental shift in
drug policy such as legalization. All that forfeiture really accomplishes is to compound the misery
associated with drug trafficking.
250. Indications are that this effect is, at best, fleeting. Seizures and arrests come and go, but
the long-term trend has been for the street price to decrease and for purity to increase. See Eric E.
Sterling, Statement to the Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives on D.E.A. Oversight, available at http://www.cjpf.org/speeches/deahear.html.
Tallies of how many tons of drugs and how many millions of dollars in assets have been seized
and forfeited provide no real helpful guidance on what progress is being made in the effort to
eradicate illegal drugs. In this respect, daily news reports on the government's progress in the war
on drugs can be likened to the "body count" reports of the Vietnam war.
251. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 23, at 84.
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real cost of enforcing drug laws, and, therefore, the laws themselves are
in danger of becoming irrational. Our democracy is founded on a funda-
mental principle: that freedom allows for a marketplace of political ideas
to flourish. However, a political idea cannot be effectively tested by that
marketplace if its cost cannot be weighed rationally against its impact or
utility.
It flows from this precept that, in order for the body politic to
rationally determine which public goods it wants from the government,
it must have some sense of the cost of those goods through taxation,
duties, user fees, and so on. The body politic must register consent to
the cost of public goods by approving or disapproving of the actions of
its elected representatives. This is, in part, the essence of "no taxation
without representation" upon which our nation was founded. Without
this ability to weigh the cost against the utility and effectiveness of pub-
lic goods, we risk losing the underlying rationality of our system of gov-
ernment to arbitrary exercises of state and federal power.
Even under the best of circumstances, unlike the situation with pri-
vate goods, taxpayers have "an incentive to give false signals concerning
their preferences"2 52 as to their demand for public goods. Public goods
are not price-rationalized by the market in the same sense that private
goods are, so public goods are necessarily funded by a system of exter-
nalized costs and benefits. Because individual taxpayer demand has a
minimal effect on the supply of a public good, 253 "by understating their
demand they can aspire to enjoy the public good without paying the
costs of provision. 254 In other words, everybody hopes to pay less tax
while enjoying more benefits from public goods.
252. ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 27 (1994).
253. "A 'true-blue' public good also requires that it is not possible to limit the consumption of
the good to any particular group or person. This condition is known as non-excludability." Id. at
26 n.16. Non-excludability is also called "non-divisibility" or "indivisibility." An indivisible
good is one which a person may use without depriving others of their ability to use it, such as
public transit or freeways. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (1986). The definition, however, seems
misleading. While an interstate highway might appear to be an indivisible good, common
experience tells us that there comes a breaking point at which such goods must be modified, or
new or alternative ones built, in order to maintain their "indivisible" character. Perhaps a more
"pure" example of a non-excludable public good would be a lighthouse. See PAPANDREOU, supra
note 252, at 27 n.18.
254. Id. Papandreou points out that:
By not revealing one's true preferences ... any one person can hope to snatch some
selfish benefit in a way not possible under the self-policing competitive pricing of
private goods; and the 'external economies' or 'jointness of demand' intrinsic to the
very concept of collective goods and governmental activities makes it impossible
for the grand ensemble of optimizing equations to have that special pattern of zeros
which makes laissez faire competition even theoretically possible ...."
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This tension between the promise of public goods and the need to
pay for them constitutes, to a large extent, the very essence of politics.
Voters tend to scoff at campaign promises precisely because they know
that, while the ideal political accomplishment would be to offer the body
politic a valuable public good which costs them nothing, every promise
to create or expand the availability of a public good has a price which
the body politic must eventually bear if that is indeed what it wants.
This tension extends not just to government-provided goods and services
themselves, but also to the underpinning laws which make them neces-
sary. The cost of law enforcement, for example, ought to be considered
in conjunction with the decision of whether or not to criminalize a cer-
tain thing or activity. Notwithstanding the litany of campaign promises
to the contrary, making something illegal does not, in and of itself, end
that thing's existence. This is only common sense, and one would hope
that the tension between costs and political goals would be enough to
keep the government from reaching beyond the rational in determining
what goods it promises to provide for the body politic's consumption.
But what if politicians found a way to pay for an expanded public
good without having to either raise additional revenue from their constit-
uents or transfer revenue out of other programs? In a very real sense,
this is what asset forfeiture has brought us. In explaining the need for a
federal power of taxation, Hamilton wrote:
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body
politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to
perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to
procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, as far as the
resources of the community will permit may be regarded as an indis-
pensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this
particular, one of two evils must ensue, either the people must be
subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible
mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into
a fatal atrophy, and in a short course of time perish.
255
That Hamilton put the choice in such stark terms should give us
pause when contemplating the revenue raising functions of any activity
of the government, for these words express the very inherent danger in
externalizing the costs of public goods (and thus government itself) onto
individuals. Civil forfeiture, as it is practiced today by our government
and the several states, is an exercise in arbitrary will in which individu-
als are indeed subjected to the very sort of "continual plunder" of which
Hamilton warned. By giving law enforcement agencies the power to
255. Alexander Hamilton, No. 30, in THE FEDERALIST 237-38 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1873) (emphasis added).
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loot, plunder, and eat what they kill, our laws teeter on the brink of
losing their necessary rational relationship with our institutions of
democracy.
Simply put, if the body politic desires drug prohibition, the body
politic must pay for that public service directly in the form of taxes. It is
only by "paying through the nose" that taxpayers will ever be able to
objectively measure the effectiveness of what they are buying.
Allowing the government to plunder hundreds of millions of dollars
annually2 56 from individuals, just so politicians can make bold promises
to perpetuate the drug war, takes the law one step farther away from
rationality. Simply diverting forfeiture proceeds directly into the general
Treasury fund, rather than the current Justice Department-controlled for-
feiture fund, is not likely resolve this fundamental dilemma.
VI. CONCLUSION: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO FORFEITURE
As it stands today, civil asset forfeiture has become an end unto
itself, a force for bureaucratic preservation masquerading as a principled
remedy for the ills of the drug war. The series of miscues that have led
to the current status quo can be likened to a multiple-car collision on a
fog-bound highway, and a complete post-mortem on the precise causes
might require volumes of discussion. What is clear is that civil asset
forfeiture came to be applied in a criminal context through some sloppy
work in the early history of our Supreme Court.257 While those early
Justices can be forgiven, we should be less patient with ourselves.
Reforming the process of forfeiture is a welcome start, but it is small
change in comparison to the deeper, more troubling difficulties that
underlie our current drug policy. The inescapable fact is that the drug
war, and the forfeiture laws that help fund it, are incompatible with our
constitutional notions of freedom and individual sovereignty. But even
if one were to accept the drug war's policy goals, the carrying-out of that
256. Agency Budget Summary of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/99ndcsbudget/assets.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2000):
At the end of 1998, a total of 24,903 seized assets were on hand with a total of $1
billion on deposit in the Seized Assets Deposit Fund. This consists of 7,799 cash
seizures with a value of $349.2 million; 1,181 real properties valued at $204.5
million; 45 businesses valued at $48.7 million; and 15,878 other assets with an
estimated value of $397.9 million.
Id. These figures only account for direct federal and federally adopted forfeitures. They do not
account for forfeitures conducted at the state and municipal level. It is also not clear whether
these were cumulative funds or annual deposits. As noted in the report by Karen Dillon, supra
note 11, at 8, the Justice Department has not produced a complete audit of the Forfeiture Fund
since 1996.
257. See discussion, supra notes 59, 61, 118, 128, 156 and 240.
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policy must be accountable to rational political processes as outlined in
Article I of our Constitution.
For forfeiture to work as a legitimate tool of justice in our society,
we must return to the principle, set forth by Roger Pilon, of addressing
remedies to fit measurable wrongs.258 This is, in essence, the argument
outlined over two hundred years ago by Attorney General Lee in La
Vengeance:259 An in rem forfeiture may only be justified where the
government has an established revenue interest in the property seized.26 °
If the forfeiture is not being brought to enforce a revenue interest in the
property, such as a customs duty, then it should only be brought subse-
quent to a criminal conviction, whereby the forfeiture is justified by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the owner committed the offense,
and that the property forfeited was a proceed or instrumentality of the
261crime. Only by framing the forfeiture remedy in such principled
terms, and by removing the pecuniary interest of law enforcement, will
forfeiture ever be truly reformed.
BRANT C. HADAWAY*
258. See Pilon, supra note 122, at 324-27.
259. Civil in rem forfeitures may also be justified by the need to abate nuisances or acquire
abandoned property.
260. In the modem context, civil in rem forfeitures may also be justified by the need for
abating nuisances or condemning unsafe buildings.
261. Forfeiture proponents often argue that a primary function of forfeiture is to provide
restitution for crime victims. See Cassella, supra note 233, at 1. However, there is little evidence
to suggest that much is made of this potential benefit of forfeiture. As a matter of fact, the
evidence suggests that police use federal adoption of forfeitures to circumvent state laws that
require forfeited assets to be deposited in victim restitution funds. See Dillon, supra note 11, at 1.
In any case, it would probably be more reasonable to allow crime victims to sue for their injuries
in civil court, and thus allow a jury to measure the wrong and determine the remedy.
* This Comment is dedicated to my daughter, Saskia, that she may grow up in a country
that has re-apprehended the true meaning of freedom.
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